Whereas there is widespread belief that workers in temporary help services (THS) are subject to poorer working conditions, in particular pay, than comparable workers in the rest of the economy, there is little evidence on whether that is driven by the sector per se or by the workers' characteristics. The rst aim of this analysis is to quantify the wage penalty, if any, for workers in THS rms. Secondly, we analyze the wage prole of workers right before and after spells of THS. Linked employer-employee data for Portugal enable us to account for observable as well as unobservable worker quality. Our results show that workers in THS rms earn lower wages than their peers and that this dierence is mostly due to the workers' characteristics. We estimate that workers in THS rms earn on average 9% less than comparable workers in the rest of the economy if we control for the workers' observable attributes only. This dierence is reduced to about 1% when we control for unobservable characteristics as well. However, interesting dierences emerge across groups. Younger workers, both men and women, earn higher wages in TAW than their peers in other rms, while the opposite holds for prime-age and older workers. Moreover, for young workers THS rms is not associated with a stigma eect that slows their wage progression after they work for THS, as opposed to prime-age and older workers, in particular males. Also before entering THS the wage * This paper was prepared for the NBER Conference on Labor Market Intermediation, May 17-18, 2007. We thank David Autor, Je Smith, participants at the NBER conference and participants in a seminar held at IZA Bonn for most helpful comments. We are grateful to the Ministry of Employment, Statistics Department, Portugal, for access to the data. René Böheim acknowledges nancial support from the Austrian National Bank, grant # 11090. † Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria. E-mail: Rene.Boeheim@jku.at ‡ Corresponding author: Ana Rute Cardoso, IZA, Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 7/9, 53113 Bonn, Germany. E-mail: cardoso@iza.org 1 trends are dierent. Prime-age and older workers, both male and female, see their wages deteriorate relative to their peers before entering THS, suggesting that adverse labor market conditions may motivate them to search for a THS job. On the contrary, for young workers we do not detect any pre-THS wage trend.
Introduction
There is much anecdotal evidence of poor working conditions in agency work, but much less hard evidence. None of the research referred to can dierentiate between factors related to agency work per se (as a form of employment) and those related to the job or the worker. (Storrie, 2002, p56) Employment in temporary help service (THS) rms has increased throughout Europe over the last decade. This development has prompted the European Commission to propose a directive to safeguard THS workers' working conditions.
In 2002 it issued a proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on working conditions for THS workers (EIRO, 2002; European Commission, 2002) , which aims to ensure that temporary workers are not discriminated against, receiving at least as favorable a treatment as a regular comparable worker in the rm where (s)he is posted. The relevant dimensions are the basic working and employment conditions, including duration of working time, rest and holiday periods, time of work, and seniority. This concern comes from widespread evidence that workers in THS rms face worse working conditions than comparable workers in the placement rm.
Evidence in Houseman (2001) suggests that THS may be used to save on worker benet costs, such as health insurance and pension contributions. These concerns extend to wage rates as there seems to be evidence of lower wages for THS workers.
Concern about workers in THS has also focused on whether they remain in low-paying, dead-end jobs or if they nd, should they so desire, employment in a standard working career. High turnover involves a loss of rm-specic human capital, a decrease in productivity if production depends on continuous cooper-ation of workers, and possibly less coverage by trade unions, factors that may contribute to poorer career prospects. On the contrary, THS could serve as a screening method (Autor, 2001; Houseman, 2001) at little cost for the rm, i.e.
without a commitment about a future employment contract. Since THS work matches a worker typically with several rms, it can be seen as a job matching mechanism.
The discussion has thus concentrated on whether or not workers in THS employment earn lower wages and whether or not THS employment enables workers to start a better career. There are numerous studies for the US that nd that THS workers receive lower wages than other workers, e.g., Segal and Sullivan (1997) who report an average wage dierence of about 28% which is reduced to about three percent when observable and time-invariant unobservable characteristics are considered. (See also, amongst others, Blank (1998) or Nollen (1996) .)
Workers may accept lower wages in THS rms because the employment in these rms allows a subsequent job match with better pay or more stable careers. Autor and Houseman (2005) , using random placement assignments, do not nd that THS work is associated with stable careers in post-THS employment. For welfare recipients, however, Heinrich, Mueser and Troske (2005) nd that work in THS is associated with better outcomes than not working at all.
The evidence for European countries is mixed. For example, Forde and Slater (2005) report a wage penalty of about 11 percent for men and 6 percent for women in THS in contrast to comparable workers in the UK. Zijl, van den Berg and Heyma (2004) nd for the Netherlands that THS work is associated with subsequent stable employment spells. Similarly, Amuedo-Dorantes, Malo and Muñoz-Bullón (2006) , for Spain, Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2002) , for the UK, and Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2006) , for Italy, nd that THS work is associated with subsequent stable employment. However, Kvasnicka (2005) nds for Germany that THS work does not improve the subsequent careers of such workers, and Antoni and Jahn (2006) nd that THS workers in Germany are increasingly found in repeated spells of THS work.
We use linked employer-employee data, obtained from the Ministry of Employment in Portugal, to analyze wages of workers in THS. These administrative data cover the universe of Portuguese workers in the private sector for the period 1995-2000. The panel dimension of these data allow us to control for worker and industry specic eects.
The purpose of the paper is twofold. We analyze, rst of all, if THS workers earn lower wages than comparable workers in other sectors by estimating wage regressions. Because participation in THS work is not random, we control for workers' xed-eects in our estimations, taking advantage of the longitudinal nature of the data. We perform the analysis separately for men and women as well as for younger and older workers, since these groups tend to fare dierently in the labor market. (We also perform the analyzes on the pooled sample.) Secondly, we analyze workers wages before and after spells of THS. On the one hand, we want to assess if THS work leads to lower wages in subsequent employment, i.e evidence of a stigma eect. On the other hand, we want to investigate if workers experienced a particular wage development before entering THS. For example, their wages could be deteriorating relative to similar workers, in which case the adverse labor market conditions would provide the motivation to search for a THS job.
Our empirical results suggest that THS workers earn about one per cent less than similar workers in other rms, once their observable and unobservable attributes are controlled for. However, disaggregation of the sample by age and gender reveals interesting dierences across groups of workers. Younger workers, both men and women, earn higher wages in THS rms than their peers in other rms. Prime-age workers, in particular men, earn a lower wage in THS rms than similar workers in other rms. Also interestingly, for young workers, THS is not associated with a stigma that slows their wage progression after they start to work in the THS sector. In contrast, for prime-age and older workers, in particular males, wage progression after entering THS is slower than for similar workers not engaged in THS. Before entering THS rms, prime-age workers, both men and women, see their wages deteriorate relative to their peers, suggesting that adverse labor market conditions might motivate them to search for a THS job.
For young workers, we do not detect any pre-THS wage trend.
Background

2.1
The association between THS work and wages
The distinguishing feature of work for a THS rm is the tripartite nature of the relationship and the commercial nature of the contract signed between the THS rm and the placement rm, which sets it apart from a traditional labor contract between a worker and a rm. Even though a particular assignment of a worker is temporary, it is not the duration of the contract that characterizes this sector.
While there is widespread belief that THS workers earn lower wages than comparable workers, in particular in countries where labor legislation is not stringent or trade union coverage is low, there are also reasons, and evidence, that point to the opposite direction. THS workers may earn a higher wage that would compensate for the risk of a more variable income stream than comparable workers.
It is also sometimes stressed that THS rms have diculty recruiting workers and need to oer favorable conditions to attract them. Storrie (2002) reports that at the the upper end of the pay scale, for instance in the health sector, THS workers seem to enjoy better pay and possibly better working conditions than regular workers. The wages in THS rms is thus an empirical issue which we will address in more detail below.
Some THS rms may choose to oer free general training instead of higher wages to attract more workers and to identify better quality workers (Autor, 2001 ). In general, the need to attract workers and the existence of economies of scale in the provision of some types of training have been pointed out as reasons why THS rms may provide more training than legally required. Such training could result in higher wages in post-THS employment.
On the contrary, Storrie (2002) and it must present records of workers hired out to using rms every six months.
The work contract is signed between the THS rm and the worker. The formal employer is thus the THS, and not the user rm, and it is responsible in particular for paying the workers, fullling the employer's Social Security obligations, providing insurance against work-related accidents, and allocating a minimum of 1% of the total turnover to training. (The THS rm is legally forbidden to charge the worker for training provided.) The user rm is responsible for fullling regulations on health and security at the workplace.
The work contract between the worker and the THS can be open-ended or of limited duration. If open-ended, the worker is entitled to pay, even in periods when (s)he is not actually assigned to a using rm. The amount is specied by collective bargaining or, if the worker is not covered, two thirds of the national minimum wage.
Firms have to justify the need for temporary workers and a narrow set of reasons is permitted: to replace workers on leave; for seasonal work; in case of a temporary increase in product demand; to bridge recruitment gaps, while the process to ll a vacancy is taking place.
The contract between the THS rm and the using rm must also specify, among other things, the duration of the assignment (which depends on the reason for use of temporary work, with a maximum limit of six months to two years), 2 A fund linked to the national minimum wage must be deposited, or a bank or insurance company guarantee presented, which is used for wage payments if the company does not pay its workers. the description of tasks to be performed, the wage the using rm pays its workers who perform similar tasks, and the amount paid to the THS rm. A THS worker is entitled to the wage set by collective bargaining for THS work or the wage paid by the user rm to similar workers, whichever is higher. Because these rules aim at providing equal treatment for regular and THS workers, we would expect to see no, or a moderate, pay dierential between THS and regular workers. Over 90% of the THS workers are covered by a collective bargaining contract, signed between trade unions and employer representatives. The regulations are monitored and enforced by the Bureau of Labor Inspection. However, situations of non-compliance with the law are frequently discussed in the press, where THS owners associations demand stricter controls by the Bureau, arguing that law-obeying rms are subject to unfair competition by rms that do not fulll the law, especially the payment of taxes and Social Security contributions. Trade unions, on the other hand, claim that workers' rights are not always respected and also demand stricter monitoring. Finally, the Bureau of Labor Inspection claims that the rms in the sector are subject to close scrutiny and argues for higher legal sanctions to increase compliance.
Although the legalization and regulation of this type of work took place relatively early in comparison to other European countries, the use of THS is not as widespread in Portugal as in other European countries. In 1999, it comprised about 1% of total employment, below the European Union average of about 1.4%.
In terms of growth, although employment in the sector more than doubled between 1995 and 1999, its growth has been modest when compared to most other European countries (Storrie, 2002, p23) .
3 In Portugal, a contract signed between workers' and employers' representatives is often extended to the all workers in a sector or rm, irrespective of their union membership status.
Data
The study is based on linked employer-employee data collected annually by the Ministry of Employment in Portugal. The data cover all rms with wage-earners in manufacturing and services in the private sector; because data provision is compulsory only for companies with wage-earners, the coverage of the agricultural sector is low. Public administration and domestic work are not covered. Reported data include the rm's industry, location, employment, ownership (foreign, private or public) and sales, and the worker's gender, age, occupation, schooling, date of admission into the company, monthly earnings, and duration of work. We use data from 1995 to 2000 since identication of THS work was not possible for earlier years.
The Portuguese Classication of Industries reports, under code 74500, rms in labor recruitment and provision of personnel.
4 This is the denition we use to identify temporary help service rms and their workers. 5 Given the relevance of the distinction between stocks and ows for this activity (with high worker turnover), it should be stressed that the data refer to the stock of workers at a reference week in October each year. 6 Wage-earners aged 16 to 65 years were selected for analysis. We consider only the worker's main job, dened as the job where the most hours were worked per month. Extensive checks have been performed to guarantee the accuracy of the data, using gender, date of birth, highest educational level and starting date in a company (details on the procedures followed to clean the panel can be found in Cardoso (2005) .)
4 This classication follows closely NACE, the Classication of Economic Activities in the European Community. Before 1995, a dierent industry classication, which did not assign a specic code to this activity, was used.
5 This denition has the disadvantage that we cannot distinguish between managers and clerical sta that operate the THS and the workers who are hired out to using rms. 6 Because of the timing of observations, we do not analyze the job tenure with THS rms because not all jobs of short duration are captured in the data.
The administrative nature of the data and the legal requirement for the rm to post the data in a space public to its workers contribute to its reliability.
Workers are identied by a personal identier, based on a transformation of the social security number, and it is thus possible to track them over time, as long as they work in the private sector. If they are missing from the database, the workers could be, among other situations, unemployed, inactive, employed in the public administration or self-employed without dependent workers and we cannot ascertain the employment status.
In the analyzes that follow, we will keep the whole population of workers who ever had a THS job, while limiting the data on workers who never had a THS job to a 10% sample, so as to keep computations manageable. For each worker sampled, all the available observations on his/her work history were kept for analysis. We report results on the overall sample, as well as separately for women and men of 16 to 25 years of age and for women and men of 26 to 65 years of age.
Gross hourly wages were computed and they were deated using the Consumer Price Index (with the year 2000 as the base period). Wage outliers, i.e., hourly wages of less than half the rst percentile or above 20 times percentile 99, have been dropped from the analysis. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of our estimating sample, by THS status. On average, THS workers had a wage lower than other workers, with a mean hourly wage dierence of about 23%. We also see that the dispersion of wages is lower for THS workers, a nding also evident in Figure 1 where we plot the two wage distributions, pooling the observations from the six years. The graph shows that the distribution of wages for THS workers is more concentrated, with a higher peak and a thinner upper tail.
[ Table 1 We observe a similar percentage of women in THS rms as in other rms in the private sector (about 42%). THS workers are on average four years younger than workers in the rest of the private sector, who are on average 36 years old.
THS workers are on average slightly better educated than other workers (about 50% of THS workers have 6 school years or less, compared to 61% in other sectors; nevertheless, there are fewer workers with a higher education diploma in THS rms than in other rms, i.e. four vs six percent). There are also more low-skilled and administrative workers in THS than in other rms. We see that workers in THS have short tenures with their rms, with 68% of THS workers having tenures of less than one year; in contrast, for all other workers the fraction of workers who have tenures of less than one year is 18%. The incidence of parttime is higher in THS rms than in the rest of the economy (25% vs 9%).
THS rms are concentrated in the Lisbon region (78%, as opposed to 42% for the remaining sectors).
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For 2000 only, data on the type of contract are available, indicating that 74% of THS workers have a xed-term contract, which compares to 15% of the workers in the rest of the private sector.
Lower pay in THS rms?
The comparison of mean wages points to a substantial and signicant wage dierence between THS and regular workers, despite the stringent legal requirements.
In this section, we investigate in more detail if such wage dierences are still evident once we control for the rm and worker characteristics. Table 2 reports the estimated coecients (and robust standard errors) of wage regressions where we estimate the hourly wages of workers in the private sector.
We use several empirical specications for men and women who are 16 to 25 years of age and for men and women of ages 26 to 65. (The full estimation results are provided in the Appendix, where we also report estimation results for the complete sample.) Specication 1 controls for location of the rm and age and education of the workers (and indicators for the year of observation). Specication 2 controls in addition for the workers' occupation, which is one of the following categories: senior managers, professionals or scientists; junior managers; administrative work-7 The agencies in Lisbon have on average a larger volume of business than companies in the rest of the economy and the share of the market held by the ve largest rms, either in terms of employment or sales volume, has remain stable at about 33% (not shown in the Table) . These gures are consistent with those reported in Storrie (2002) and they show Portugal as one of the countries where THS is least concentrated in Europe; only the UK and Germany have a lower market concentration.
ers; service and sales workers; farmers; skilled workers and craftsmen; machine operators, assembly workers; unskilled workers.
Because workers do not randomly choose to work for a THS rm, any observed wage dierence between THS and other workers may be caused by personal characteristics not observed by us. We therefore estimate wage regressions where we control for worker unobservable quality by introducing worker xed eects. 8 The estimated coecients from these estimations are presented in Columns 3 and 4
of Table 2 , where specication 3 (specication 4) has the same set of controls as specication 1 (specication 2).
[ Table 2 near here.]
The estimations show that younger women who work for a THS rm receive a higher wage than women who work for other rms. This is supported both by the OLS and the xed-eects regressions. We estimate that they receive a wage which is about four to ve percent higher than similar workers in other rms. For younger men, the results are not as pronounced as for young women, as young men earn on average a wage that is about one to two percent higher in THS rms than in other rms. All these estimated wage dierences are statistically signicant at an error level of ve percent, or less.
According to the OLS estimates, older women who work in THS rms earn about 12 percent less than similar women who work for other rms. This dierences is dramatically reduced when we control for unobserved characteristics in the xed-eects estimates. The results from the xed-eects estimates point to a lower wage at around 1 percent, or less. For prime-age male workers, however, we obtain coecients that indicate a much more severe dierence between working 8 Identication in this regressions of the impact of education on wages is feasible given that a share of the workforce is observed changing increasing its education level. These shares are 2%, 2%, 2%, and 1%, respectively for workers initially observed with 4, 6, 9, and 12 years of education.
for THS and other rms. We estimate, controlling for xed characteristics, that these workers earn a wage which is about ve percent lower than similar workers (if not controlling for the worker unobservable quality, that penalty would be between 16 and 23 percent).
6 Wages before and after working in THS rms
We proceed placing the spells of THS employment in the context of the workers' careers. The wages of those workers who chose to work for a THS rm could have been deteriorating relative to similar workers prior to entering a THS rm.
This relative wage loss could have been their motivation to start a THS job. A second issue concerns the workers' careers once they start working for a THS rm and their wage progression thereafter. Two dierent hypotheses on the wage development upon entering the sector may be formulated. THS rms typically place workers in several rms and this improves their position to nding a good job match, possibly leading to being formally hired by a rm that already hired them through the THS rm. As such, a worker would have already accumulated some rm-specic human capital and we then expect the worker to have a comparable, if not faster, wage progression than other workers on leaving the THS rm. Alternatively, working for a THS might be interpreted as a signal of lower ability by employers and would result in fewer and/or worse job oers than other workers would receive. This kind of mechanism would lead to poorer employment prospects for former THS workers and their wages would be lower than those of otherwise similar workers.
In the vein of Segal and Sullivan (1998) and Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) , we construct a set of dummy variables to capture the number of years before or after the start of the THS spell. For each worker, the dummy variable D k t is 1 if the worker at time t is k years away from the start of the THS spell.
Because our data cover 6 years, we have allowed k to range between -2 and 2, with a negative (positive) k indicating the time before (after) the start of a spell of THS employment. If the worker works for an THS rm at time t, the dummy variable D 0 t is equivalent to a dummy variable on THS work, similar to the one used in the specications above. 9 We report results including controls for location, age, education and worker xed eects, and the year of observation (with and without occupation included). For this part of the analysis, we dropped workers who had more than one spell of THS, which led to an exclusion of seven percent of workers who ever had a THS spell. Table 3 reports the estimated coecients for the indicator variables that control for employment episodes before and after the start of the THS spell. Focusing on the estimated coecient on THS, the estimations conrm the previous results, i.e., young workers earn a higher wage in agencies than their peers. In contrast, older workers earn lower wages in THS rms than in other rms, with the dierence being smaller for women than for men.
[ Table 3 near here.]
Before entering THS, we observe that there are no dierences in terms of wages for young workers between those who started to work in for a THS rm and those who did not. The motivation to enter THS seems to be dierent for younger than for older workers, because we estimate that older workers, both men and women, see their wages deteriorate relative to similar workers before 9 We have also used dummy variables for the post-THS wages that indicate the time since the end of the THS employment. However, since most THS spells are of a short duration, the interpretation of our ndings change little. These results are available at request from the authors.
starting to work in a THS rm, suggesting that adverse labor market conditions may motivate prime-age workers to search for a THS job.
After the start of the THS spell, we estimate that young female workers enjoy higher wages than their peers, at least for the two years we are able to investigate, a wage dierence of some two to four percent. We do not nd this pattern for young male THS workers. For them, post-THS wages are not signicantly dierent from similar workers in other sectors, after accounting for worker unobservable quality. Older female workers are estimated to have about one percent lower wages than women who did not work for a THS rm, but the dierence is smaller than in the years before the THS spell where it amounted to some three percent. Older male THS workers receive about four percent less than comparable workers before and after their THS spell.
Conclusion
Using unique linked employer-employee data from Portugal that cover the entire private sector we investigate whether or not workers in THS rms receive a lower wage than workers who work for other rms. Despite the extensive legal protection of THS workers, we observe a wage dierence of about 23% for THS workers in the raw data. Once we control for standard human capital indicators, the dierential is estimated to be 9%. The available data allow a more careful analysis in that we are able to control for unobservable workers' characteristics by using workers' xed-eects in our estimations. Controlling for this type of factors, the wage penalty of THS workers is reduced to 1% to 2%, for the overall labor force.
However, interesting dierences emerge across groups of workers: young and older, males and females. For young workers, working for a THS rm results in wages that are higher than other sectors. The dierence is particularly high for women who earn about 4% to 5% higher wages in THS than elsewhere; for young men the dierence is about 1%. In contrast, for older workers THS work is associated with a wage penalty, which is larger for males than for females.
The wage developments before starting to work for THS are clearly dierent for young and older workers, which may result in a dierent motivation to start working for a THS rm. Before entering a THS rm, prime-age workers see their wages deteriorate relative to similar workers, suggesting that adverse labor market conditions motivate them to search for a THS job. For younger workers, we cannot detect any pre-TWA wage trend.
The impact of THS employment on the subsequent career is dierent for young and older workers, too. For young females, wages are higher one and two years after starting to work for THS than for comparable women in other rms.
For them, the training, networking or other skills provided by THS rms lead to a faster wage growth than for similar workers elsewhere in the economy. For young males, the results do not dier signicantly between those who worked for a THS rm and those who did not. For older workers, we identify once again a detrimental impact of THS work since after the start of the THS spell, their wages remain signicantly below those of similar workers not in THS, particularly for males.
The evidence collected lends support to attempts (namely by the European Commission) to safeguard the workers in THS rms and their subsequent career progression, in particular for prime-age and older workers. For young workers, the evidence suggests that working for a THS rm can be an entry gate and stepping stone in the labor market. Note: Specications 1 and 2 are based on pooled OLS wage regressions and specications 3 and 4 are xed-eects panel wage regressions. All specications control for location of the rm, age and education of the workers, and the year of observation. Specications 2 and 4 control in addition for the workers' occupation. The full set of estimation results are provided in the Appendix. Robust standard errors. Estimations based on MTSS, 1995-2000, Portugal. Asterisks indicate statistical signicance at the following levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. Note: All specications control for location of the rm, age, education and worker xed eects, and the year of observation. The full set of estimation results are provided in the Appendix. Robust standard errors. Estimations based on MTSS, 1995-2000, Portugal. Asterisks indicate statistical signicance at the following levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. Note: Adjusted R 2 reported for the xed-eects regressions. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate statistical signicance at the following levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. All regressions control for year of observation. Estimations based on MTSS, 1995-2000, Portugal. Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate statistical signicance at the following levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. All regressions control for year of observation and worker xed eects. Estimations based on MTSS, 1995-2000, Portugal. Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate statistical signicance at the following levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. All regressions control for year of observation and worker xed eects. Estimations based on MTSS, 1995-2000, Portugal. Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate statistical signicance at the following levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. All regressions control for year of observation and worker xed eects. Estimations based on MTSS, 1995 -2000 
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